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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that the 2007 Polish parliamentary election is best understood as a 
plebiscite on the polarising right-wing Law and Justice party-led government and its 
controversial ‘Fourth Republic’ political project. The liberal-conservative Civic 
Platform opposition won because it was able to persuade Poles that voting for them 
was the most effective way of removing this government from office. The election also 
indicates that the ‘post-communist divide’ that dominated and provided a structural 
order to the Polish political scene during the 1990s is passing into history and 
certainly means a more consolidated Polish party system. However, Poland still has 
very high levels of electoral volatility and low electoral turnout, together with low 
levels of party institutionalisation and extremely weak links between parties and their 
supporters. This means that it is too early to say whether the election also marks the 
emergence of a stable Polish party system based on a new bi-polar divide between 
two big centre-right groupings, with the confinement of the left to the status of a 
minor actor.  
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In October 2007 Poles held a parliamentary election two years ahead of schedule, 
following the break up of a controversial and turbulent coalition government led by 
the right-wing Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość: PiS). In the event, 
although the two main parties were evenly matched for most of the election campaign, 
and Law and Justice increased both its share of the votes and parliamentary 
representation, the governing party finished well behind the opposition liberal-
conservative Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska: PO) on a relatively high turnout. 
With the collapse in support for, and exclusion from parliament of, the Law and 
Justice party’s radical coalition partners, the agrarian Self-Defence (Samoobrona) and 
the clerical-nationalist League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin: LPR), the 
2007 election has produced a much more consolidated Polish party system. Together 
with the continued marginalisation of the centre-left, this has led some commentators 
to speculate that the election marks the birth of a bi-polar party system in which two 
large centre-right blocs provide both the core of the government and the main 
opposition and dominate the political scene for the foreseeable future.  
 
This paper examines the 2007 Polish parliamentary election campaign and its possible 
significance for the future development of the Polish party system. It begins by 
looking at the background and context to the election, surveying the main 
developments in the Polish party system in the 2005-7 parliament. Section two 
examines the short but intensive six-week election campaign before section three 
moves on to analyse the results briefly. Finally, section four looks at what, if any, 
lessons can be drawn from this election about the long-term trajectory of Polish 
politics, particularly whether new divisions are emerging within the Polish party 
system. 
 
The paper argues that the 2007 Polish parliamentary election is best understood as a 
plebiscite on a polarising government and that Civic Platform won because it was able 
to persuade Poles that voting for them was the most effective way of removing it. The 
election also indicates that the ‘post-communist divide’ that dominated and provided a 
structural order to the Polish political scene during the 1990s is passing into history 
and certainly means a more consolidated Polish party system. However, Poland still 
has very high levels of electoral volatility and low electoral turnout, suggesting that 
most Poles still cannot locate themselves in the party system and that the electorate 
remains an ‘open’ one. Together with low levels of party institutionalisation and the 
extremely weak nature of the links between parties and their supporters, this makes it 
far too early to say whether we are seeing the emergence of a stable Polish party 
system based on a new bi-polar divide between two big centre-right groupings with 
the confinement of the left to the status of a minor actor.  
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Polish party development in the 2005-7 parliament 
 
The previous September 2005 parliamentary election was a bi-polar contest between 
two centre-right, socially conservative parties emerging from the Solidarity tradition, 
Law and Justice1 and the more liberal Civic Platform,2 following a collapse in support 
for the governing communist successor Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy 
Demokratycznej: SLD).3 In spite of policy differences, especially on the economy, the 
two parties had worked together in the 2001-5 parliament and were widely expected 
to form a coalition after the election, with the prime minister being the leader of 
whichever of the two won the most seats. However, although Law and Justice 
finished narrowly ahead, its leader Jarosław Kaczyński declined the premiership, 
fearing that concerns about twins holding the two highest elected state offices would 
damage the chances of his twin brother, Lech, in the presidential election that was 
held immediately after the parliamentary poll. Instead, the party nominated the more 
consensual Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, who was not part of its top leadership, as prime 
minister. One month later, Lech Kaczyński defeated Civic Platform leader Donald 
Tusk in the presidential election. The Law and Justice party’s victories in both of 
these elections owed much to their success in framing them as a choice between Civic 
Platform's ‘liberal’ economic policies and their apparently more ‘social’ or 
‘solidaristic’ approach. In fact, Civic Platform and Mr Tusk actually achieved the best 
results by a liberal party and presidential candidate in any post-1989 Polish election; 
albeit, in large part, because of the party’s successful efforts to re-profile itself as 
more socially conservative and ‘patriotic’ during the previous four years.4 
 
The bitterness of the prolonged election campaign soured relations between the two 
parties and, following the breakdown of coalition negotiations, Law and Justice 
formed a minority government and Civic Platform became the main opposition party. 
As the Law and Justice caucus in the Sejm, the more powerful lower house of the 
                                                 
1
 The Law and Justice party was formed in April 2001 by Jarosław Kaczyński to capitalise on the 
popularity of his twin brother, Lech, during his brief stint as justice minister towards the end of the 
1997-2001 parliament. Law and Justice finished fourth in the 2001 election but when Lech Kaczyński 
became the first ever directly elected mayor of Warsaw in October 2002, the party used this as a 
springboard for its successful 2005 parliamentary and presidential election campaigns. 
2
 Civic Platform was formed in January 2001 to capitalise on former finance and foreign minister 
Andrzej Olechowski’s relative success as an independent liberal-conservative candidate in the 2000 
presidential election. The liberal Donald Tusk became Civic Platform’s sole leader in June 2003, the 
party having been previously led by a triumvirate that included Mr Tusk and Mr Olechowski. 
3
 The Democratic Left Alliance was formed at the beginning of the 1990s as an electoral coalition 
comprising various parties and groupings clustered around Social Democracy of the Polish Republic 
(Socjaldemokracja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej: SdRP), the direct organisational successor to the Polish 
communist party. It won the 1993 parliamentary election and was the main government party between 
1993-97 but lost the 1997 election to Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność: AWS). 
In June 1999 it was transformed into a single, unitary party and won the 2001 parliamentary election 
easily in coalition with the smaller Labour Union (Unia Pracy: UP), although falling just short of a 
parliamentary majority. However, the party then suffered a massive slump in support to finish fourth in 
the 2005 parliamentary election. For more on the 2005 elections, see: Radoslaw Markowski, ‘The 
Polish Elections of 2005: Pure Chaos or a Restructuring of the Party System?’ West European Politics, 
Vol.29 No.4 (2006), pp.814-832; Frances Millard, ‘Poland’s politics and the travails of transition after 
2001,’ Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.58 No.7 (2006), pp.1007-1031; and Aleks Szczerbiak, ‘”Social Poland 
Defeats “Liberal Poland”?: The September-October 2005 Polish Parliamentary and Presidential 
Elections,’ Journal of Communist Studies and Transitional Politics, Vol.23 No.2 (2007), pp.203-232. 
4
 See: Witold Gadomski, ‘Widzę szansę dla Platformy’, 4 November 2005 at 
http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/kraj/2029020,34314,3001707.html (Accessed 6 November 2005).  
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Polish parliament, comprised only 155 deputies, well short of the 231 required for a 
majority, the new government had to look to smaller parties to secure support for its 
programme. Initially, it sought a parliamentary majority by signing a so-called 
‘stabilisation pact’ at the beginning of 2006 with two radical parties: Self-Defence 
party5 and the League of Polish Families.6 However, Law and Justice soon came to 
the conclusion that the stabilisation pact was an unreliable basis of support for the 
government and, following an unsuccessful attempt to dissolve parliament, the three 
parties signed a more formal coalition agreement at the beginning of May 2006. As a 
consequence, the controversial Self-Defence and the League of Polish Families 
leaders, Andrzej Lepper and Roman Giertych, joined the government as deputy prime 
ministers. 
 
Mr Marcinkiewicz came from the Law and Justice party’s more liberal and pragmatic 
wing and was clearly at odds ideologically with the two radical parties, so bringing 
them into government placed further strains on his already uneasy relationship with 
Jarosław Kaczyński. Although Mr Marcinkiewicz ran the day-to-day business of 
government he lacked any power base within the party, of which Mr Kaczyński 
remained the unquestioned leader and most important political strategist. Nonetheless, 
Mr Marcinkiewicz quickly carved out a niche and became Poland’s most popular 
politician by portraying himself as a hard working and independent-minded prime 
minister above the political fray.7 In July 2006, clearly unhappy about the way that Mr 
Marcinkiewicz was emerging as a strong political figure in his own right, Mr 
Kaczyński decided to remove him and take over the job of prime minister himself.8 
 
Although the Law and Justice leader hoped that a formal coalition agreement would 
provide his party with a more stable parliamentary majority, the government was 
always a fractious one. Both smaller coalition partners knew that, ultimately, their 
political future depended upon their ability to differentiate themselves from Law and 
Justice. This led to continued instability, with Law and Justice having to use the threat 
of an early election continuously as a disciplinary device against its coalition partners; 
who, opinion polls suggested, would struggle to secure representation in a new 
parliament.9 In fact, the coalition almost collapsed in September 2006 when Self-
                                                 
5
 Self-Defence was set up in the early 1990s as both a political party and farmers’ union by Andrzej 
Lepper, one of the most controversial figures in Polish politics who first came to prominence as leader 
of radical farmers’ protests against debt foreclosures. Mr Lepper returned to front line politics during 
farmers’ blockades at the beginning of 1999 and surprised observers when Self-Defence emerged as 
the third largest party in the 2001 parliamentary election. The party held on to its share of the vote in 
the 2005 parliamentary election, while Mr Lepper finished a strong third in the presidential election 
scoring an impressive 15% of the vote. 
6
 The League of Polish Families was formed in the run up to the 2001 parliamentary election as a 
coalition of various right-wing and clerical-nationalist parties. However, it was registered and contested 
the election as just one party (in order to be eligible for the lower 5% threshold for parliamentary 
representation) and was re-organised subsequently as a single, unitary party. The League held on to its 
share of the vote in 2005. 
7
 See, for example: Igor Zalewski, ‘Premier dobrego Wrażenia,’ Rzeczpospolita, 28 December 2005; 
Mariusz Janicki, ‘IV RP czy IV PR?’ Polityka, 7 January 2006; Jarosław Murawski, ‘Do tańca i 
różańca,’ Rzeczpospolita, 26 January 2006; and Janina Paradowska, ‘Studniówka Marcinkiewicza,’ 
Polityka, 11 February 2006. 
8
 See: Janina Paradowska, ‘Pierwszy na pierwszego,’ Polityka, 15 February 2006. 
9
 See, for example: Dominik Uhlig and Wojciech Szacki, ‘Koalicja szkodzi mniejszym,’ 14 November 
2006 at http://gazetawyborcza.pl/gazetawyborcza/2029020,75478,2724215.html (Accessed 14 
November 2006). 
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Defence was expelled briefly from the government following Mr Lepper’s continual 
acts of disloyalty and increasingly vocal criticisms, prompted by fears that Law and 
Justice was making significant inroads into his party’s core rural electorate. However, 
Self-Defence was invited back after three weeks when Law and Justice failed to 
construct an alternative parliamentary majority with the Polish Peasant Party (Polskie 
Stronnictwo Ludowe: PSL),10 a rival agrarian party. A scandal that emerged at the 
beginning of December 2006, when Self-Defence party leaders were accused of 
forcing women to have sexual relationships with them in exchange for party jobs, 
placed further strains upon the coalition. 
 
The fact that Civic Platform emerged as the main opposition party to the Law and 
Justice-led government, meant that the political scene continued to be dominated by 
these two parties, with opinion polls suggesting, and the autumn 2006 local elections 
appearing to confirm, that they were fairly evenly balanced in terms of their popular 
support.11 The Law and Justice party’s ability, unlike governing parties in the two 
previous parliaments, to both remain organisationally intact and retain a firm hold on 
a significant portion of the electorate, was remarkable given the government’s 
frequent political crises. The party’s success was due partly due to strong economic 
growth and falling unemployment, together with the fact that it failed to introduce any 
radical social or economic reforms that might have produced negative short-term 
electoral consequences. However, more fundamentally, the Law and Justice-led 
government focused relentlessly on its core election promises of fighting crime and 
corruption and introducing reforms that it claimed would restore probity in public life. 
Thus the party retained a loyal core of supporters prepared to give it the benefit of the 
doubt as long as it appeared to be delivering on its programme of moral and political 
renewal aimed at creating a ‘Fourth Republic’.12 
 
Another reason why support for the Law and Justice party held up relatively well was 
Civic Platform’s inability to capitalise fully on the government’s difficulties. Civic 
Platform chose a deliberate strategy of selective rather than outright parliamentary 
opposition, partly in order to pre-empt attacks from Law and Justice that it was 
blocking efforts to fight corruption and reform the state, but also because it actually 
shared many of the ruling party’s criticisms of how institutions of post-1989 Poland 
had functioned.13 This meant supporting key elements of the government’s legislative 
programme in parliament, including: establishing a new anti-corruption bureau 
(Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne: CBA), reforming the military intelligence services, 
and extending the scope of lustration (vetting individuals for their links with the 
communist-era security services). This was also part of the party’s broader political 
strategy of positioning itself as a liberal-conservative alternative to the Law and 
Justice party for centre-right voters and rebuffing attempts by Mr Kaczynski to 
portray it as a straightforward ‘liberal’ party and thereby detach its more conservative 
                                                 
10
 The Peasant Party was formed in 1990 as the organisational successor to the former communist 
satellite United Peasant Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe: ZSL). It was the junior coalition 
partner in Democratic Left Alliance-led governments between 1993-97 (with its leader Waldemar 
Pawlak premier from October 1993-February 1995) and 2001-3. The party’s share of the vote had been 
in steadily decline since 1993 and most commentators were surprised when it crossed the 5% threshold 
to secure parliamentary representation in 2005. 
11
 See: Piotr Smiłowicz, ‘Porażka Samoobrony, klęska LPR,’ Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2006. 
12
 See, for example: Anna Materska-Sosnowska, ‘Karty w rękach PiS’, Newsweek, 16 September 2007; 
and Jarosław Makowski, ‘Skazani na PiS,’ Newsweek, 16 September 2007. 
13
 See, for example: Agnieszka Rybak, ‘Drugi PiS, bez Bliźniaków,’ Polityka, 4 March 2006. 
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supporters who would be alienated if the party was aligned too closely with the 
discredited centre-left. 14  However, by criticising the government for its 
ineffectiveness and centralising tendencies, while failing to set out a clear and 
distinctive alternative, the party also sent out very confusing signals to the electorate, 
coming across as opportunistic and vague. Consequently, while Civic Platform reaped 
some short-term rewards from being the main opposition to a polarising government, 
and often polled ahead of the Law and Justice party, it never opened up a significant 
lead and its high ratings were based on little enthusiasm.15 
 
However, the centre-left was also unable to take advantage of the potential political 
opening created by the government’s continued problems and Civic Platform’s 
relative weakness and only experienced a modest revival in 2005-7. In the run up to 
the autumn 2006 local elections a new centre-left electoral alliance of four parties 
called the ‘Left and Democrats’ (Lewica i Demokraci: LiD) was formed, anchored by 
the Democratic Left Alliance but also comprising the Democrats (Demokraci), a small 
liberal party that included well-known figures from the Solidarity-led governments of 
the 1990s.16 However, although the centre-left’s decline in support appeared to have 
bottomed out so that by the time that the 2007 election was called it had emerged as 
the ‘third force’ in Polish politics, it was still well behind the two main centre-right 
parties in the polls. This was partly because the centre-left’s hopes of reaping the 
electoral rewards from emerging as the moderate opposition to the widely expected 
Civic Platform-Law and Justice coalition government were scuppered when Mr 
                                                 
14
 See, for example: Jarosław Gowin, ‘Rynek z religią, tradycja z edukacją,’ Rzeczpospolita, 28 April 
2006; Michał Karnowski, ‘Prawdziwie kusząca oferta,’ Rzeczpospolita, 19 June 2006; Jacek Rostowski, 
‘Odrodzenie Platformy,’ Rzeczpospolita, 20 June 2006; Janusz Lewandowski, ‘Platforma Obywatelska: 
liberałowie i konserwatyści przeciw jakobinom,’ Rzeczpospolita, 17 May 2007; and Jacek Rostowski, 
‘Upadek wielkiego stratega,’ 25 October 2007 at  
http://www.gazetawyborcza.pl/gazetawyborcza/2029020,75515,4610310.html (Accessed 29 October 
2007). Interestingly, even as late as August 2007 a Civic Platform-Law and Justice coalition was still 
the first choice of a substantial number of voters. See: Piotr Pacewicz, ‘Sondaż “Gazety”: Koalicje, 
jakich chcemy,’ 13 August 2007 at  
http://www.gazetawyborcza.pl/gazetawyborcza/2029020,75478,4384548.html (Accessed 16 August 
2007). 
15
 For a selection of critiques of Civic Platform’s opposition strategy from a range of different 
perspectives see, for example: Janusz A. Majcherek, ‘Opozycyjny marazm,’ Rzeczpospolita, 13 June 
2006; Barbara Fedyszak-Radziejowska, ‘Sukces umykający uwadze,’ Rzeczpospolita, 22 June 2006; 
Mirosława Grabowska, ‘Więcej tego samego,’ Rzeczpospolita, 15-16 July 2006; Mariusz Janicki and 
Wiesław Władyka, ‘Partia NIE-PiS’, Polityka, 28 October 2006; Janusz A. Majcherek, ‘Zmarnowany 
rok opozycji,’ 31 October 2006 at http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/wyborcza/2029020,34474, 3710893.html 
(Accessed 1 November 2006); Witold Gadomski, ‘PO na sukces musi zapracować,’ 9 December 2006 
(Accessed 12 December 2006); and Igor Zalewski, ‘Gdzie są tamci liberałowie,’ 10 April 2007 at 
http://www.dziennik.pl/Default.aspx?TabId&BackToCategory=3&ShowArticleId=392989 (Accessed 
16 April 2007). Cf: Janina Paradowska, ‘Opozycja na pozycji,’ Polityka, 20 January 2007; and Igor 
Janke, ‘Platforma przycisnęla PiS do muru,’ Rzeczpospolita, 29 May 2007. 
16
 See: ‘Centrolewica wreszcie razem,’ Rzeczpospolita, 4 September 2006. The Democrats emerged 
from the Freedom Union (Unia Wolności: UW), a party formed in April 1995 through a merger of two 
‘post-Solidarity’ liberal-centrist parties, the Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna: UD) and the 
Liberal Democratic Congress (Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczna: KLD) that, between them, supplied 
three of Poland’s first four post-1989 premiers: Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki and 
Hanna Suchocka. Freedom Union was Solidarity Electoral Action’s junior coalition partner in 1997-
2000 but failed to secure re-election to parliament in 2001 following a split when Mr Tusk led most of 
his liberal supporters out of the party to form Civic Platform. The Freedom Union re-packaged itself as 
the Democrats at the beginning of 2005 but once again failed to cross the 5% threshold for 
parliamentary representation. 
 9 
Tusk’s party went into opposition in 2005. Consequently, much of the anti-
government vote tended to orientate towards Civic Platform as the main opposition 
party and, therefore, most effective way of removing the Law and Justice from 
office.17 
 
The crisis that led to the break up of the coalition and parliamentary dissolution began 
in July 2007 when Mr Kaczyński sacked Mr Lepper from the posts of deputy prime 
minister and agriculture minister. This followed allegations that Mr Lepper was a 
suspect in a sting operation being conducted by the central anti-corruption bureau 
centred on an alleged bribe to re-classify agricultural land in Poland’s lake district as 
property for commercial development; allegations that Mr Lepper denied vigorously. 
Although Mr Kaczyński would probably have preferred the parliament to run its full 
four-year term, when these allegations emerged the political costs of continued 
association with Mr Lepper became too high. The Law and Justice leader tried 
initially to keep the coalition together, but a government that excluded the Self-
Defence leader never really had any chance of survival and efforts to broker a peace 
over the summer proved impossible. An attempt to create a new parliamentary 
majority by persuading enough Self-Defence deputies to defect and join Law and 
Justice, the League of Polish Families and other smaller parliamentary groupings and 
independents (fearful of losing their seats) foundered when the two junior coalition 
partners formed an electoral coalition called the ‘League and Self-Defence’ (Liga i 
Samoobrona: LiS) that, they claimed, would be the precursor to a new party. 
Although the new coalition only lasted a few weeks, in the short term it emboldened 
the two parties by making them more confident of crossing the 5% threshold for 
parliamentary representation in an early election, and therefore less willing to 
compromise on Mr Kaczyński’s terms. When, in apparent breach of the coalition 
agreement, the prime minister rejected the Self-Defence nominee to replace Mr 
Lepper as agriculture minister and instead appointed Law and Justice deputy 
Wojciech Mojzeszowicz, who had resigned from Self-Defence in the previous 
parliament after a fierce clash with its leader, Mr Lepper’s party formally declared an 
end to the coalition. 
 
Mr Kaczyński responded by firing all the remaining ministers from the two smaller 
parties and also declaring the coalition to be over. Although this still left him in office 
as head of a minority government, he sensed that the continual political bargaining 
needed to secure parliamentary majorities would soon erode the Law and Justice 
party’s credibility and support. Another important consideration here was probably 
the decision, in early August, of the State Election Commission to reject party’s 
annual financial statement (together with that of the Democratic Left Alliance) 
because it had accepted funds from foreigners and institutions in 2006 as a result of 
which it was set to lose over 65 million złoties in budget subsidies over the next three 
years, unless the parliamentary term came to an end.18 In the event, Mr Kaczyński 
                                                 
17
 See: Rafał Kalukin, ‘Lewica w poszukiwaniu miejsca i elektoratu,’ 14 November 2005 at 
http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/kraj/2029020,34314,3012848.html (Accessed 14 November 2005) 
18
 See: Agnieszka Sopińska and Bernadeta Waszkielewicz, ‘Kłopoty finansowe PiS i SLD,’ 
Rzeczpospolita, 4-5 August 2007. The decision was actually over-turned subsequently by the supreme 
court (although not in the case of the Democratic Left Alliance) but only after the election had been 
called so Law and Justice could not have been aware of this when making its calculations as to whether 
or not to call a snap poll. See: Eliza Olczyk, ‘PiS obroniło swoją dotację,’ Rzeszpospolita, 2 October 
1997. 
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gambled on an early election and - with Law and Justice, Civic Platform, the 
Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish Peasant Party all voting solidly in favour - 
the Sejm voted by 377 votes to 54 for a dissolution, easily securing the two-thirds 
majority of 307 votes needed to cut short the parliamentary term. 
 
The Campaign 
 
For most of the campaign opinion polls suggested that the two centre-right parties 
were running neck-and-neck. Indeed, until the final week it was actually Law and 
Justice that had set the terms of the debate.19 Mr Kaczyński made his government’s 
fight against corruption the focal point of the party’s professional and highly effective 
campaign, hammering home his message that his was the only party committed to 
fighting the ‘układ’ or network of politicians, business leaders and members of the 
former communist security services that, they argued, had exerted such a baleful 
influence on political and economic life in post-1989 Poland.20 This appeared to make 
sense from an electoral strategic point of view, as law and order and corruption 
seemed to be the issues on which the government had the highest levels of public 
approval. For example, an August-September 2007 CBOS survey found that 40% of 
respondents said that the government’s record of fighting corruption was good, 30% 
that it was adequate and only 20% that it was poor.21 Similarly, 40% said that the 
government’s record on public safety issues was good, 34% that it was adequate and 
only 19% that it was poor.22 As a secondary campaign theme, Law and Justice also 
claimed credit for strong economic growth and falling unemployment.23 Again this 
appeared to make sense given that, for example, an August-September CBOS 2007 
survey found that 30% of respondents felt that the government’s economic record was 
good, 42% that it was adequate and only 21% that it was poor.24 Moreover, Law and 
Justice was able to overshadow the defection of a number of important political 
figures associated with the party to Civic Platform, such as former defence minister 
Radosław Sikorski (who resigned from the government in February 2007 following a 
                                                 
19
 See, for example: Marek Migalski, ‘Społeczeństwo nie wstydzi się już PiS,’ 5 September 2997 at 
http://www.dziennik.pl/Load.aspx?TabId=2097lsnf=p&f=59128 (Accessed 12 September 2007); and 
Konrad Ciesołkiewicz, ‘Lekcja wyborczego profesjonalizmu,’ Rzeczpospolita, 12 October 2007. 
20
 See, for example: Jaroslaw Kaczynski, ‘Nie obiecujemy cudów – obiecujemy konkrety,’ 8 October 
2007 at http://www.dziennik.pl/Load.aspx?TabId=2097lsnf=p&f=63180 (Accessed 9 October 2007). 
For good analyses of the politics of the ‘układ’ see: Mariusz Janicki and Wiesław Władyka, ‘Układ,’ 
Polityka, 1 April 2006; Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński, ‘W sieci układu,’ Rzeczpospolita, 22-23 April 2006; 
and Rafał Matja, ‘Układ w Polsce cały czas istnieje,’ 9 July 2007 at 
http://www.dziennik.pl/Load.aspx?TabId=2097lsnf=p&f=51870 (Accessed 13 July 2007). 
21
 See: CBOS, Szczegółowe oceny diałalności rządu, (Warsaw: CBOS, September 2007), p.3. 9% did 
not know. 
22
 See: Ibid, p.2. 7% did not know. However, the evidence on this was mixed. For example, an August 
2007 TNS-OBOP survey found that 37% of respondents thought that the level of corruption had 
actually increased under the Law and Justice-led government, 39% felt that it had stayed the same and 
only 16% felt that it had been reduced (8% did not know). Similarly, 33% thought that the country was 
less just, 40% that there had been no change in this respect and only 16% felt that it was more just 
(11% did not know). See: TNS/OBOP, Spór o ocenę Polski za rządów Prawa i Sprawiedliwości, 
(Warsaw: TNS OBOP, September 2007), p.2. A September 2007 TNS-OBOP survey also found that 
87% of respondents felt that corruption was still common in Poland; although that number had fallen 
from 94% in August 2005 and those who felt that it was ‘very common’ fell from 67% to 42%. See: 
TNS OBOP, Korupcja: zmiana w latach 2005-2007, (Warsaw: TNS-OBOP October 2007) p.2. 
23
 See, for example: ‘Premier: To najlepsze lata Polski od wielu dekad,’ 25 August 2997 at 
http://gospodarka.gazeta.pl/gospodarka/2029020,33181,44337884.html (Accessed 27 August 2007). 
24
  See: CBOS, Szczegółowe oceny diałalności rządu, p.2. 6% did not know. 
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clash with Mr Kaczyński), by persuading Nelly Rokita - the wife of Jan Rokita, one of 
Civic Platform’s best know leaders and its candidate for prime minister in 2005 - to 
run on the Law and Justice ticket in the Warsaw constituency. This prompted Mr 
Rokita, one of the most important members of Civic Platform’s conservative wing, to 
stand down as an election candidate.25 
 
The weakness of the Law and Justice party’s strategy was that it was based on 
polarising the campaign around support for or opposition to the outgoing government. 
However, opinion polls had shown consistently that, although the party retained a 
loyal core electorate, Mr Kaczyński’s administration always had more opponents than 
supporters. For example, CBOS surveys conducted between August 2006-October 
2007 found that the number of respondents who considered themselves government 
supporters ranged from 24-31% and opponents from 36-48%.26 The numbers who 
evaluated the Kaczyński government positively ranged from 23-33% and the number 
who evaluated it negatively from 39-63%.27 Similarly, TNS-OBOP surveys conducted 
between August 2006-September 2007 found that the number of respondents who 
evaluated the Kaczyński government positively ranged from 17%-26%, while the 
number who evaluated it negatively was between 67-74%. 28  The number who 
evaluated prime minister Kaczyński’s performance positively ranged from 20-30% 
while the number who evaluated him negatively ranged from 49%-69%.29 
 
This meant that while the Law and Justice campaign was extremely successful at 
consolidating and mobilising the government’s supporters, as the party absorbed most 
of its former coalition partners’ vote, there was a ceiling above which it was always 
going to be difficult for it to rise. For example, an August-September 2007 CBOS 
survey found that while 22% of Law and Justice voters would support Civic Platform 
as their second preference, only 8% of Civic Platform voters felt the same about Mr 
Kaczyński’s party.30 The same survey also found a substantial increase in the number 
of voters who said that they would never vote for Law and Justice from only 9% in 
May 2005to 34% in 2007.31 However, in spite of this, for most of the campaign Civic 
Platform struggled to convey an effective message that could persuade this extremely 
disparate group of voters united only in their dislike of the Kaczyński government to 
vote for them.32 
                                                 
25
 A September 2007 GfK Polonia poll conducted for ‘Rzeczpospolita’ found that 56% of respondents 
felt that Mr Rokita’s resignation would weaken Civic Platform while only 22% thought that would 
strengthen it (14% did not know, 8% said it would have no impact). See: Dorota Kołakowska, ‘Misja 
Gowina po odejściu Rokity,’ Rzeczpospolita, 17 September 2007. Cf: Jacek Kucharczyk, ‘Spychanie 
Platformy na mieliznę,’ Rzeczpospolita, 27 September 2007. 
26
 See: CBOS, Stosunek do rządu, (Warsaw: CBOS, July 2007), p.2; and CBOS, Notowania rządu 
Jarosława Kaczyńskiego pod koniec jego działalności, (Warsaw: CBOS, October 2007), p.1. The 
number who were indifferent ranged from 19-31% and the number of don’t knows between 3-5%. 
27
 See: CBOS, Stosunek do rządu, p.3; and CBOS, Notowania rządu Jarosława Kaczyńskiego pod 
koniec jego działalności, p.3. The number of don’t knows ranged from 11%-34%. 
28
 See: TNS-OBOP, Społeczne oceny rządu, premiera i prezydenta we wrześniu 2007 r, (Warsaw: 
TNS-OBOP, September 2007), p.3. The number of don’t knows ranged from 7-11%. 
29
 See: Ibid., p.5. The number of don’t knows ranged from 9-17%, if one excludes the 30% figure for 
his first month in office (August 2006). 
30
 See: CBOS, Siła preferencji politycznych, alternatywy wyborcze i elektoraty negatywne, (Warsaw: 
CBOS, September 2007), p.6. 
31
 See: Ibid., p.10. 
32
 See, for example: Marek Migalski, ‘Pięć grzechów głównych Platformy,’ Rzeczpospolita, 9 October 
2007; and Janina Paradowska, ‘Tusku! Tusku!’ Polityka, 13 October 2007. 
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The turning point was a strong performance by Mr Tusk in a debate with a 
surprisingly lacklustre Mr Kaczyński, held nine days before the election and watched 
by millions of Poles on prime time TV.33 The Kaczyński-Tusk debate shattered the 
prime minister’s image of invincibility and allowed Mr Tusk to re-invent himself as a 
dynamic and effective leader.34 The Civic Platform leader followed up his victory 
over the prime minister when, in another (somewhat more evenly matched) TV debate 
held three days later with former President and the centre-left’s candidate for prime 
minister Aleksander Kwaśniewski, he made a powerful pitch for all anti-Law and 
Justice voters to rally around his party as the most effective way of defeating Mr 
Kaczyński.35 Following the TV debates, the dynamics of the campaign changed as 
Civic Platform finally found a convincing theme around which it could unite this 
diverse group of voters and squeeze the centre-left. The party made bold pledges that, 
by adopting the ‘Irish model’ and abandoning excessive regulations, it could bring 
about an ‘economic miracle’ that would pay for improved public services and 
infrastructure. Moving away from an open espousal of economic liberalism, it also 
tried to exploit the dis-satisfaction of public sector workers with the Law and Justice-
led government, by promising better salaries for doctors, nurses and teachers. All of 
this would, the party argued, prevent Poles from being forced to work abroad in order 
to improve their standard of living. Civic Platform tried thereby to transcend the 
‘liberal versus social-solidaristic Poland’ dichotomy that had cost it victory in the 
2005 election by arguing that the party supported a ‘liberal economic policy and a 
solidaristic social policy’, as Mr Tusk put it in his debate with the Law and Justice 
leader.36 
 
Law and Justice could not develop an effective response to this and an attempt during 
the final week to shift the campaign back on to its strongest issue, corruption, ended 
up back-firing on the party. Earlier in the campaign, the central anti-corruption bureau, 
                                                 
33
 See: ‘Komentatory są zgodni: debatę wygrał Tusk,’ 13 October 2007 at 
http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/wybory2007/2029020,85057,4574786.html (Accessed 16 October 2007); and 
‘Sondaże: Miażdżące zwycięstwo Tuska,’ 15 October 2007 at 
http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/wybory2007/2029020,85057,4574526.html (Accessed 16 October 2007). For 
an interesting analysis, see: Barbara Fedyszak-Radziejowska, ‘Sztucki prostackie, ale skuteczne,’ 
Rzeczpospolita, 15 October 2007. Mr Kaczyński acknowledged subsequently that he made a mistake in 
agreeing to the debate. See: Jarosław Kaczyński, ‘Tych wyborów i tak byśmy nie wygrali,’ 
Rzeczpospolita, 26 October 2007. 
34
 See, for example: Piotr Semka, ‘Kampania ostatniej prostej,’ Rzeczpospolita, 15 October 2007. A 
June 2007 GfK Polonia survey for ‘Rzeczpospolita’ found that 59% of voters felt that Mr Tusk was not 
an asset for his party (16% ‘definitely not’) compared with only 42% who felt that he was (12% that he 
‘definitely was’); 9% did not know. See: Małgorzata Subotić, ‘Donald Tusk zerka w strone 
Kaczyńskich i Rokity,’ Rzeczpospolita, 18 June 2007. An October 2007 GfK Polonia survey for 
‘Rzeczpospolita’ also found that only 39% of respondents expected Mr Tusk to win the debate with Mr 
Kaczyński compared with 44% who expected the Law and Justice leader to emerge victorious; 17% did 
not know. See: Agnieszka Sopińska and Bernadeta Waszkielewicz, ‘Tusk celuje w dwie debaty,’ 
Rzeczpospolita, 5 October 2007. 
35
 See: Bernadeta Waszkielewicz and Anna Gielewska, ‘Walka o antypisowski elektorat,’ 
Rzeczpospolita, 16 October 2007. 
36
 See: Eliza Olczyk and Agnieszka Sopińska, ‘Ostre i decydujące starcie liderów,’ Rzeczpopospolita, 
13-14 October 2007. For good analyses of Civic Platform’s retreat from open economic liberalism, see: 
Michał Karnowski, ‘PO nauczyła się wygrać’, 22 October 2007 at 
http://www.dziennik.pl/Load.aspx?TabId=2097lsnf=p&f=64913 (Accessed 22 October 2007); and 
Piotr Zaremba, ‘Osobisty sukces Tuska,’ 22 October 2007 at 
http://www.dziennik.pl/Load.aspx?TabId=2097lsnf=p&f=64911 (Accessed 22 October 2007). 
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which was headed by a former Law and Justice parliamentary deputy Mariusz 
Kamiński, had arrested Beata Sawicka, a little known Civic Platform deputy, in a 
sting operation while accepting a bribe in exchange for promising to fix a public 
auction for real estate on an attractive vacation spot on the Baltic coast. Ms Sawicka 
was thrown out of the party immediately but then, during the last week of the 
campaign, Mr Kamiński held a sensational press conference, broadcast live and re-
broadcast on prime time TV, where he laid out publicly the case against Ms Sawicka, 
showing hidden camera footage of her taking the bribe.37 Although Mr Kamiński 
claimed that the arrest and subsequent press conference were un-related to the election 
campaign, Law and Justice clearly hoped to use the ‘Sawicka affair’ as a symbol of 
the party fulfilling its promises to fight corruption at the same time as discrediting 
Civic Platform as being part of the problem. Moreover, among the quotations from 
Ms Sawicka selected by Mr Kamiński was mention of the possibility of cashing in on 
the privatisation of hospitals which prompted Law and Justice to attempt to use the 
Sawicka affair to link the issues of corruption and health service commercialisation. 
The party ran a campaign advert showing the ECG line of a patient waiting for an 
ambulance flattening out as they failed to provide the phone operator with their 
payment details - thereby claiming that Civic Platform planned to privatise hospitals 
and (implicitly) emergency services; a claim that Mr Tusk’s party denied 
vigorously.38 
 
However, rather than helping Law and Justice to re-gain the initiative, the whole 
affair appeared to confirm the opposition’s claims that the party was using the anti-
corruption drive to intimidate its political opponents and gain an advantage in the 
election, particularly when Ms Sawicka held an emotional press conference the next 
day during which she broke down in tears.39 For example, a TNS OBOP poll for the 
‘Dziennik’ newspaper, found that 45% of respondents felt that the anti-corruption 
bureau’s press conference was ‘part of a dirty campaign’ and only 31% that it was 
motivated by ‘the citizens’ right to know the truth’. 40  A GfK Polonia poll for 
‘Rzeczpospolita’ conducted just after the election also found that 61% of respondents 
felt that the anti-corruption bureau had been politicised and was engaged mainly in 
finding compromising material on the Law and Justice party’s political opponents 
(33% felt this strongly), while only 31% disagreed with this proposition (10% 
strongly).41 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 See: Cezary Gmyz, ‘Grupa posłanki Sawickiej,’ Rzceczpospolita, 17 October 2007.  
38
 See, for example: ‘Nasi przecziwnicy chcą prywatyzować szpitale i zlikwidować CBA,’ 18 October 
2007 at http://www.pis.org.pl/article.php?id=10386 (Accessed 22 October 2007). 
39
 See, for example: Cezary Gmyz, ‘Burza po taśmach Sawickiej,’ Rzeczpospolita, 18 October 2007. 
For an analysis of how the ‘Sawicki affair’ damaged the Law and Justice party, see: Igor Janke, 
‘Przegraną PiS przypieczętowała posłanka Sawicka,’ Rzeczpospolita, 22 October 2007. For contrasting 
views on whether the Law and Justice party and the central anti-corruption bureau acted properly in 
this case, see: Igor Janke, ‘CBA zagrało dla Kaczyńskich’, Rzeczpospolita, 18 October 2007; and 
Bronisław Wildstein, ‘Wszyscy wykorszystują sprawę Sawickiej,’ Rzeczpospolita, 18 October 2007.  
40
 See: ‘Polacy nie wierzą w czyste intencje CBA,’ at 17 October 2007 at 
http://www.dziennik.pl/Load.aspx?TabId=2097lsnf=p&f=64475 (Accessed 18 October 2007). 24% did 
not know. 
41
 See: ‘Polacy nie chcą likwidacji CBA – wolą by włączono je w inne struktury,’ Rzeczpospolita, 27-
28 October 2007. 8% did not know. 
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Results 
 
In the event, as Table 1 shows, Civic Platform won a clear victory with 41.51% of the 
votes and 209 (out of 460) seats in the Sejm. Although Law and Justice increased both 
its share of the votes and parliamentary representation, it finished well behind Civic 
Platform with only 32.11% of the vote and 166 seats. Given that the two main parties 
had been evenly matched for most of the campaign, the scale of Civic Platform’s 
victory came as a surprise to most commentators. Nonetheless, in spite of its 
impressive victory, Civic Platform fell short of the 231 seats required for a 
parliamentary majority in the Sejm and had to form a coalition government with the 
Peasant Party. In spite of concerns that becoming prime minister could damage his 
2010 presidential election chances, Mr Tusk agreed to head up the government, while 
Peasant Party leader Waldemar Pawlak became his deputy.  
 
 
Table 1: September 2007 Parliamentary election results to the Sejm 
 
 Votes % 2005 (%) Change (%) Seats 
Civic Platform 6 701 010 41.51 24.14 +20.97 209 
Law and Justice 5 183 477 32.11 26.99 +5.12 166 
Left and Democrats 2 122 988 13.15 17.74* -4.59 53 
Polish Peasant Party 1 437 638 8.91 6.96 +1.95 31 
Self-Defence 247 335 1.53 11.41 -9.88  
League of Polish Families 209 171 1.30 7.97 -6.67  
 
Source: Polish State Electoral Commission (http://www.pkw.gov.pl/) 
*Combined vote for Democratic Left Alliance (11.31%), Polish Social Democracy-Labour Union 
(3.98%) and the Democrats (2.45%). 
 
 
As expected, the Left and Democrats emerged as the third largest grouping with 
13.15% of the votes and 53 seats. However, this was a disappointing result given that 
it was less than the total combined vote for these parties in the 2005 election and 
fewer than the 55 seats that the Democratic Left Alliance won on its own. This was in 
large part because, as noted above, most anti-Law and Justice voters tended to opt for 
Civic Platform as the most effective of removing Mr Kaczyński’s party from office.42 
Moreover, Mr Kwaśniewski, who was the most popular figure on the centre-left and 
should have been its greatest electoral asset,43 also proved something of a mixed 
blessing. Although he performed competently in televised debates with Mr Kaczyński 
and Mr Tusk, he also appeared to be drunk while trying to make speeches on two 
other occasions during the campaign.44 For example, an October 2007 CBOS poll 
                                                 
42
 See: Jacek Wódz, ‘Nie ma lewicy, jest kasta i wygoda,’ Newsweek, 25 November 2007. 
43
 For example, a March 2007 GfK Polonia poll for ‘Rzeczpospolita’ found that 51% of respondents 
thought that Mr Kwaśniewski’s return to the Polish political scene would be beneficial (17% 
‘definitely’ so) and only 39% thought that it would not (20% ‘definitely’ not). See: ‘Kwaśniewski mile 
widziany,’ Rzeczpospolita, 28 March 2007. 
44
 For good analyses of Kwaśniewski’s shortcomings during the election campaign see, for example: 
Ireneusz Krzemiński, ‘Zmurszały, choć polakierowany Kwaśniewski,’ 18 October 2007 at 
http://www.dziennik.pl/Load.aspx?TabId=2097lsnf=p&f=64455 (Accessed 18 October 2007); and 
Rafał Matja, ‘Koniec Kwaśniewskiego,’ 27 October 2007 at 
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found a sharp drop in the level of trust for Mr Kwaśniewski during the course of the 
campaign from 57% in September 2007 to only 44% in October.45 However, while it 
is easy to focus on the Left and Democrats’ organisational, programmatic and 
strategic weaknesses,46 the grouping always had to grapple with more fundamental 
problems. The centre-left, and Democratic Left Alliance in particular, were still too 
closely associated with the political elites that had been discredited following 
numerous sleaze and corruption allegations that emerged during the 2001-5 
parliament when the party was in government to offer voters an attractive 
alternative.47 For example, although an August-September 2007 CBOS survey found 
that although the number of voters who said that they would never vote for the centre-
left had fallen since May 2005 (when 48% said this about the Democratic Left 
Alliance), the number still remained relatively high at 28%.48 
 
Civic Platform’s coalition partner in the new government, the Peasant Party, came 
fourth with 8.91% of the votes and 31 seats. The Peasant Party had been in coalition 
with the Democratic Left Alliance in 1993-97 and 2001-3 but almost failed to cross 
the threshold for parliamentary representation at the 2005 election. However, the 
party reversed its decline this time and appeared to win back the support of many of 
the rural voters that it lost to Self-Defence in the two previous elections by presenting 
itself as a pragmatic and calming influence on the political scene.49 All the other 
political groupings failed to cross the 5% threshold; including the Law and Justice 
party’s two former coalition partners, Self-Defence and the League of Polish 
Families, 50  whose support collapsed to only 1.53% and 1.3% of the electorate 
respectively.51 Exit poll data showed that 43.9% of 2005 League of Polish Families 
voters and 26.8% of Self-Defence voters switched to the Law and Justice party in 
2007.52 
 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.dziennik.pl/dziennik/europa/atricle69600/Koniec_Kwasniewskiego.html (Accessed 28 
November 2007). 
45
 See: CBOS, Zaufanie do polityków w trakcie kampanii wyborczej, (Warsaw: CBOS, October 2007), 
p.4. 
46
 See, for example: Cezary Łazarewicz, ‘Ten trzeci,’ Polityka, 29 September 2007; and Piotr 
Śmiłowicz and Andrzej Stankiewicz, ‘Arka Kwaśniewskiego’, Newsweek, 7 October 2007. 
47
 See, for example: Witold Gadomski, ‘Duch lewicy,’ 5 June 2007 at 
http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/gazetawyborcza/2029020,75515,4202027.html (Accessed 6 June 2007); and 
Marek Migalski, ‘Paradoksy Aleksandra Kwaśniewskiego,’ Rzeczpospolita, 22 August 2007. 
48
 See: CBOS, Siła preferencji politycznych, alternatywy wyborcze i elektoraty negatywne, p.10. 
49
 See, for example: ‘Pawlak: PSL przywróci pokój w polskiej polityce,’ 8 Setpember 2007 at 
http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/wybory2007/2029020,85057,4471382.html (Accessed 12 September 2007); 
and Krystyna Naszkowska, ‘Wieś woli Pawlaka od Kaczyńskiego,’ 22 September 2007 at 
http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/gazetawyborcza/2029020,75478,4510555.html (25 September 2007). 
50
 The League contested the election in an electoral alliance with the Right-wing of the Republic 
(Prawica Rzeczypospolitej: PR) party, a small Catholic-conservative breakaway from Law and Justice 
led by former Sejm speaker Marek Jurek, and (bizarrely given the League’s interventionist economic 
policies) with the radical free market Union of Real Politics (Unia Polityki Realnej: UPR) as the 
League of the Right-wing of the Republic (Liga Prawicy Rzeczypospolitej, which also had the Polish 
acronym ‘LPR’). See: Tomasz P. Terlikowski, ‘Giertych, Jurek, Korwin-Mikke – trzech panów w 
wyborczej desperacji,’ Rzeczpospolita, 17 September 2007. 
51
 For good analyses of the weakness of these two parties’ campaigns, see: Tomasz P. Terlikowski, 
‘Andrzej Lepper przeszedł do historii,’ Rzeczpospolita, 22 October 2007; and Rafał Ziemkiewicz, 
‘Prawica z LPR zepchnięta na margines,’ Rzeczpospolita, 22 October 2007. 
52
 See: Piotr Pacewicz, ‘Skąd się wzieło tyle wyborców?’ 24 October 2007 at 
http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/wybory2007/2029020,85407,46067185.html (Accessed 29 October 2007). 
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As Table 2 shows, at 53.9%, turnout was the highest of any of the six parliamentary 
elections held since 1989. This relatively large mobilisation - particularly among 
young, urban voters - was felt to have helped Civic Platform.53 For example, exit poll 
data revealed that turnout in large cities - who, as Table 3 shows, voted for Civic 
Platform overwhelmingly - was 62.9%, while turnout among rural voters, who tended 
to support Law and Justice, was only 42.6%. Similarly, 52.4% of 18-24 year olds, 
most of whom also supported Mr Tusk’s party, turned out to vote compared with only 
45.1% of voters who were over 60, who backed Law and Justice.54 Consequently, 
although Law and Justice actually increased its total vote by two million, exit poll 
data shows that it was only able to mobilise 1,859,000 new voters compared to the 
2,532,000 who voted for Civic Platform.55 
 
 
Table 2: Turnout in post-1989 Polish elections (%) 
 
 Presidential Parliamentary 
1990 60.6(1) 
53.4(2) 
 
1991  43.2 
1993  52.1 
1995 64.7(1) 
68.2(2) 
 
1997  47.9 
2000 61.1  
2001  46.2 
2005 49.7(1) 
51.0(2) 
40.6 
2007  53.9 
 
Source: Rzeczpospolita, 14 June 2004; and Polish State Electoral Commission (http://www.pkw.gov.pl/) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53
 Law and Justice party leaders and strategists certainly felt this. See: Agnieszka Sopińska, ‘PiS: jak 
przegraliśmy to co mozna było wygrać,’ Rzeczpospolita, 23 October 2007; and Jarosław Kaczyński, 
‘Tych wyborów i tak byśmy nie wygrali,’ Rzeczpospolita, 26 October 2007. 
54
 The exit poll was conducted for Polish state TV’s election night special by TNS-OBOP. 
55
 See: Pacewicz, ‘Skąd się wzieło tyle wyborców?’. 
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Table 3: Voting profile of party supporters in the October 2007 Polish 
parliamentary election (%) 
 
 Civic Platform Law and 
Justice 
Left and 
Democrats 
Polish Peasant 
Party 
     
Place     
Villages 31.2 38.5 8.9 15.0 
-50,000 45.8 30.0 12.9 7.0 
51-200,000 48.4 27.4 15.9 4.3 
201-500,000 52.5 27.2 14.4 2.8 
500,000+ 57.1 25.6 11.7 2.5 
     
Education     
Basic 27.4 44.0 9.2 10.5 
Vocational 31.3 41.0 10.7 10.1 
Middle 44.2 30.9 12.8 7.9 
Higher 55.1 23.2 12.7 6.0 
     
Age     
18-19 55.2 24.7 8.7 6.0 
20-24 50.7 22.0 10.4 5.9 
25-39 51.6 25.7 11.1 7.5 
40-59 40.4 33.9 11.9 9.3 
60+ 30.0 41.6 16.3 6.8 
     
Sex     
Male 42.6 31.4 12.6 8.2 
Female 45.8 31.1 11.7 7.5 
     
Average 41.51 32.11 13.15 8.91 
 
Source: PBS exit poll data published in Andrzej Stankiewicz, ‘Pospolite Ruszenie,’ Newsweek, 28 
October 2007. 
 
 
The long-term trajectory of Polish politics 
 
So what, if any, conclusions can we draw from this election about the long-term 
trajectory of Polish politics, particularly about whether new divisions are emerging 
within the party system? During the 1990s, in spite of the high levels of electoral 
volatility and party instability that characterised the Polish party system, there was an 
apparent underlying structural order based on clear and relatively stable dimensions of 
left-right competition. Most voters could locate themselves on a left-right divide and 
this ideological self-placement was strongly linked to voting behaviour and party 
preferences.56 However, the dominant axis of left-right competition in Poland was a 
                                                 
56
 See Krzysztof Pankowski. ‘Lewicowość-prawicowość: deklaracje polityczne Polaków 1990-1997’ in 
Lena Kolarska-Bobińska and Radosław Markowski (eds.), Prognozy i wybory. Polska Demokracja ’95 
(Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1997), pp.69-108; Tadeusz Szawiel. ‘Zróźnicowanie lewicowo-
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historical-cultural one: framed by a combination of attitudes towards the communist 
past and moral-cultural issues, particularly the role of the Catholic Church in public 
life, and closely linked to levels of religiosity measured by regularity of church 
attendance. As Grabowska argued in her influential monograph, the May-June 1989 
‘semi-free’ elections, in which the Solidarity-led democratic opposition scored a 
decisive victory over candidates supported by the communist regime, represented a 
‘founding election’ that carved out the two sides of what she terms the ‘post-
communist’ political divide that dominated post-1989 Polish electoral and party 
politics.57 On one side of this divide, the ‘left’ was identified primarily with: a more 
positive attitude towards the communist past, liberal social values, secularism and 
opposition to a significant public role for the Church. On the other side, the ‘right’ 
was associated with: anti-communism and support for the Solidarity movement, 
conservative social values, high levels of religiosity and a significant role for the 
Church in public life.58 Socio-economic class and attitudes towards related issues such 
as the distribution of wealth, role of the state in the economy, and levels of taxation 
and public expenditure - the main determinants of the left-right divide in most 
established Western democracies - represented very much a secondary axis in the 
Polish party system. This ‘post-communist divide’ dominated Polish politics 
throughout the 1990s and - for a brief period in the run up to, and immediately after, 
the 1997 parliamentary election - even appeared to be mapping on to the Polish party 
system with the emergence of a bi-polar divide between the Democratic Left Alliance 
and the centre-right Solidarity Electoral Action conglomerate.59 
 
Since the end of the 1990s, the ‘post-communist divide’ has been crumbling and the 
2005 parliamentary and presidential elections, in particular, raised serious questions 
as to whether it was giving way to a new era of political divisions based on a different 
set of socio-demographic and issue alignments. In particular, the ‘post-Solidarity 
versus ex-communist’ conflict appeared increasingly anachronistic and irrelevant; 
exemplified by fact that support for the communist successor Democratic Left 
Alliance, representing one side of the ‘post-communist divide’, slumped to its lowest 
level in any post-1989 election and both main parties in the parliamentary election 
and presidential candidates emerged from the same, post-Solidarity tradition and 
shared a broadly conservative orientation in terms of moral-cultural issues. Attitudes 
towards socio-economic issues also appeared to emerge as a dominant campaign 
theme, particularly during the final stages of the elections, exemplified by the 
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apparent conflict between ‘social-solidaristic’ and ‘liberal’ visions of Poland 
represented by Law and Justice and Civic Platform. Detailed statistical analysis of the 
2005 party electorates also suggested that the left-right socio-economic divide was 
becoming an increasingly significant factor in determining voting behaviour.60 
 
So what was the evidence from the 2007 parliamentary election? Did it mark another 
nail in the coffin of the ‘post-communist divide’? Are we seeing the consolidation and 
stabilisation of Polish politics and the party system around a new bi-polar axis based 
on the division between the two big centre-right parties, Civic Platform and Law and 
Justice? And will this provide a basis for structuring the Polish political scene in the 
longer-term? 
 
Firstly, this election certainly appeared to provide further evidence that the old 
divisions that dominated Polish politics in the 1990s were passing into history. Once 
again, attitudes towards the communist past and the historic ‘ex-communist versus 
post-Solidarity’ divide hardly featured at all in the campaign. This was not surprising. 
Not only did the two main parties, as in 2005, emerge from the Solidarity tradition, 
but even the Democratic Left Alliance managed to finally transcend the ‘historic 
divide’ by joining forces with the Democrats, a party that contained many well know 
figures from the Solidarity movement. At one stage it appeared that the communist 
past might have a higher profile in the 2007 campaign when the issue of lustration 
surfaced briefly in mid-September as the Institute of National Memory (Instytut 
Pamięci Narodowej: IPN) began publishing the names of public figures who were 
registered as being collaborators with, or where spied upon by, the former communist 
secret police before 1989. However, although the first group of names of those spied 
upon included the President, prime minister and speakers of both houses of parliament, 
the issue blew over quickly when it was decided not to include the names of any other 
parliamentary candidates because the Institute did not want to appear to be 
influencing the election outcome.61 
 
Moral-cultural issues also played very little role in the election campaign, other than 
on the margins. For sure, Law and Justice tried to pitch itself as the most pro-Church 
party62 and the clerical-nationalist broadcaster Radio Maryja, which was extremely 
influential with Poland’s ‘religious right’ electorate, once again mobilised its 
supporters to vote for the party.63 Civic Platform tried to finesse this by to attempting 
to counter-mobilise Radio Maryja’s opponents: featuring a notorious recording of 
Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, the station’s proprietor, in one of its campaign broadcasts 
criticising President Kaczynski’s wife for her contacts with feminist organisations and 
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calling her a witch; implying that Law and Justice was so desperate to retain the 
Catholic broadcaster’s support that it was even prepared to endure these kind of 
insults on the First Lady.64 Civic Platform also tried to associate itself with more 
‘liberal’ members of the Episcopate, such as influential Archbishop of Kraków and 
former private secretary to John Paul II Cardinal Stanisław Dziwisz, who agreed to 
meet Mr Tusk during the final week of the campaign.65 However, this was very much 
a minor theme in the main party campaigns and, as in 2005, the Church hierarchy did 
not play an active role nor take any official stance in the election.66 
 
Secondly, when one examines some of the standard measures used in comparative 
party politics, this election certainly provides evidence of the consolidation and 
(relative) stabilisation of the Polish party system. As Table 4 shows, only four parties 
and electoral alliances were elected to the new Sejm, the smallest number in any post-
1989 election and down from twenty nine in 1991, six in 1993, five in 1997, and six 
in 2001 and 2005. Moreover, these four parties have now been represented 
continuously in the Sejm since 2001, so the last two Polish elections have seen no 
‘new entrants’ into the party system. Civic Platform and Law and Justice also 
consolidated their position as the two largest parties as the 2007 poll saw them 
obtaining the highest-ever combined share of the vote by the two main parties in any 
post-1989 election. This figure has increased from 51.13% in 2005 to 73.62% in 
2007; the previous record being when Solidarity Electoral Action and the Democratic 
Left Alliance won 60.96% of the votes in 1997. Similarly, the share of seats won by 
the two largest parties increased from 62.6% in 2005 to a record 81.52% in 2007. 
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Table 4: Party fragmentation in post-1989 Poland 
 
 1991 1993 1997 2001 2005 2007 
Number of parties elected to 
the Sejm 
29 6 5 6 6 4 
Share of votes won by two 
largest parties (%) 
24.31 35.81 60.96 53.72 51.13 73.62 
Share of seats won by two 
largest parties (%) 
25.52 65.87 79.35 61.09 62.60 81.52 
 
Source: Radosław Markowski and Mikołaj Cześnik, ‘Polski system partyjny: dekada zmian 
instytucjonalnych i ich konsekwencje,’ in Radoslaw Markowski (ed.), System Partyjny i Zachowanie 
Wyborcze: Dekada Polskich Doświadczeń (Warsaw: ISP PAN, 2002), pp.17-47(p.20); and author’s 
calculations. 
 
 
Thirdly, an important additional factor encouraging party system consolidation and 
stabilisation is the state party funding regime which has expanded progressively and 
becoming increasingly important to Polish parties since 1989.67 In particular, the role 
of state party funding in Poland was transformed by amendments to the party and 
election laws in 2001 that increased both the level and scope of election refunds and 
state subventions substantially for parties than won more than 3% of the votes. For 
example, following the 2007 election, Civic Platform will obtain 38 million złoties 
per annum in subventions, Law and Justice 35.5 million, the parties comprising the 
Left and Democrats 21.5 million (13.5 million of which will go to the Democratic 
Left Alliance) and the Peasant Party 14 million.68 At the same time, the 2001 law also 
prevents parties from obtaining funding from any other sources except: membership 
subscriptions, small individual donations (not exceeding fifteen times the level of the 
minimum wage), wills, bequests, and interest on savings. Parties are forbidden to 
engage in business activity, derive income from office rental, sell party bulletins, 
organise public collections and sell ‘bricks’ (a form of anonymous campaign 
donation), or obtain money from foreigners or individuals not living in Poland. This 
has made state party funding the main source of income for a number of parties which 
- at a time when Polish political campaigning has been increasingly professionalised, 
and therefore more costly69  - clearly favours ‘insiders’ and makes it increasingly 
difficult for new entrants to break into the party ‘cartel’; arguably explaining why 
none have done so since 2001.70 
 
So the 2007 election certainly provided evidence of party system consolidation and 
stabilisation. This prompted some analysts to question assumptions that left-right 
divisions reflecting West European models would structure Polish party competition. 
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Instead, drawing analogies with the USA and Ireland, they predicted that the Polish 
party system might settle into a pattern of bi-polar competition between the two major 
centre-right parties, Civic Platform and Law and Justice, representing liberal-
conservative and conservative-national blocs. These would provide both the core of 
the government and the main opposition, with the social democratic centre-left 
relegated to the status of, at best, a marginal third force.71 The ‘social-solidaristic’ 
Law and Justice party would, it was argued, absorb the electoral constituencies likely 
to be supportive of left-wing socio-economic policies. At the same time, with many of 
the concerns about excessive Church influence on Poland around which the secular 
left mobilised in the early 1990s having receded, the social base for a liberal cultural 
left was felt to be too narrow to sustain a major party in a socially and culturally 
conservative country like Poland.72 
 
However, while the 2007 election certainly provided strong evidence that both the old 
‘post-communist divide’ was passing in to history and of apparent party system 
consolidation and stabilisation, one should be extremely cautious about drawing too 
firm conclusions about the future trajectory of Polish politics from this election. In 
particular, it is certainly far too early to say: what is replacing these old divisions, 
what the social and ideological bases are of the new divisions that are emerging, and 
whether we are seeing the emergence of a stable party system based on this new bi-
polar divide. Indeed, other evidence suggests that the Polish political scene remains 
fluid and unstable. 
 
Firstly, levels of electoral volatility are still very high in Poland compared to other 
European countries.73 Although the level of aggregate electoral volatility calculated 
according to the so-called ‘Pedersen index’ fell from 38.39% in 2005 (and a massive 
49.3% in 2001 when both governing parties actually failed to cross the thresholds for 
parliamentary representation!) to ‘only’ 24.94% in 2007,74 this is still extra-ordinarily 
high in comparative European terms and, for example, far exceeds the 8.4% registered 
in West European elections between 1960-89.75 Moreover, these aggregate volatility 
figures of changes in party vote shares could mask even higher levels of individual 
level electoral volatility: the number of actual voters who switched parties. 
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Markowski found that individual level volatility in the 2005 election was actually 
62.64% and that in no post-1989 election has it ever fallen below 55.94%.76 
 
Secondly, for sure, as Table 2 shows, 2007 saw a substantial increase in election 
turnout from only 40.6% in 2005 to 53.9%, a post-1989 high for a Polish 
parliamentary election. This was probably due to the polarised nature of the electoral 
contest: comparative studies show that closeness of the race is the key driver in 
determining differences in the levels of electoral turnout within countries.77 Moreover, 
as Table 2 also shows, the turnout in post-1989 Polish presidential elections has 
always been significantly higher than for parliamentary elections (even when they 
were not closely contested as in 2000) so the increasingly personalised nature of 
Polish election contests – in this case due, in large part, thanks to the importance of 
the TV debates in party campaigning – was also likely to have encouraged higher 
turnout. Nonetheless, at only 53.9% turnout in Polish parliamentary elections remains 
incredibly low by European standards. For example, Jungerstam-Mulders’ survey of 
parliamentary election turnout in the eight post-communist states that joined the EU in 
2004 found an average of 64.9% in the elections held in 1994-2003, while the figure 
for the fifteen ‘older’ member states over the same period was 76.5%.78 This, together 
with the continuing high levels of electoral volatility, suggests that most Poles still 
cannot locate themselves properly in the Polish party system and that the Polish 
electorate remains ‘open’ and potentially available. 
 
Thirdly, one of the main factors accounting for why the Polish electorate remains so 
relatively ‘open’ and fluid, is that Polish parties appear to have extremely weak links 
with their voters. This can be observed in a number of ways. According to 
comparative data produced by Mair and van Biezen, Poland had the lowest level of 
party membership at the end of the 1990s among the twenty countries surveyed, at 
only 1.15% as a percentage of the electorate (326,500) compared with the average of 
5%. 79  Similarly, according to the 1999-2000 European Values Survey party 
membership in Poland was the lowest in Europe standing at only 0.7% of the 
population.80 Low membership levels stemmed both from the fact that Polish parties 
have made few attempts to develop organic links with and ‘encapsulate’ their 
supporters, but also because Poles have extremely negative attitudes towards parties 
so that even if party strategists actively sought to recruit substantially more members 
their prospects for success would be slim.81 For example, Eurobarometer data from 
autumn 2006 showed that only 7% of Poles expressed trust in political parties, the 
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lowest of any EU member state and compared with an average of 17%.82 Moreover, 
survey evidence also suggests that levels of party identification in Poland have 
actually fallen in recent years. An April 2007 CBOS survey found that the number of 
respondents who said that there was a political party that they felt close to had fallen 
from 57% in March 1998 to only 33%. At the same time, the number who said that 
there was no party that they identified with at all increased from 27% to 54%.83 These 
low levels of institutionalisation and weak nature of the links with their supporters, 
therefore, makes the parties themselves very unstable, thereby increasing the 
possibility of further re-alignments within the Polish party system. 
 
Fourthly, for sure the Polish state party funding regime does discriminate in favour of 
existing parties. However, this does not mean that there is no scope at all for new 
entrants to emerge, particularly those that originate within existing parliamentary 
parties. These enjoy automatic access to ‘indirect’ state party funding in the form of 
the wide range of resources available to individual parliamentarians - notably the 
salaries, expenses and material resources provided the by the Sejm and Senate 
Chancelleries to help them perform their parliamentary duties, at both national and 
constituency level. These are, in many ways, as important to Polish parties as the 
election refunds and subventions paid directly to the party central offices.84 Indeed, in 
one sense, the prospect of state party funding may have actually reduced barriers to 
party system entry in Poland as newly formed parties with high opinion poll ratings 
could take out bank loans using the prospect of the election refunds and subventions 
that will be paid to them in the future as collateral. On the other hand, parties that 
break the funding rules or fail to submit accurate annual financial statements or 
accounts of their election expenses face reductions in their refunds and donations. A 
good election result is, therefore, no guarantee in itself of future financial security and 
even the parties within the current parliament cannot feel completely comfortable 
about their continued access to state funding. In the 2001-5 parliament, for example, 
the Peasant Party lost its entire subventions, and Self-Defence and the League of 
Polish Families had proportions of there’s deducted by the State Election Commission, 
to due irregularities in party accounts.85 As noted above, had an early parliamentary 
election not been held in 2007 then the Democratic Left Alliance would have lost its 
entire subvention for the remainder of 2005-9 parliament; as would Law and Justice 
had its appeal against the State Electoral Commission not been successful.  
 
So, all this makes the Polish party system very brittle and vulnerable to further shocks 
and possible party re-alignments. What, then, are the likely sources of structural 
weakness within the party system that could lead to possible party re-alignment? In 
the short to medium-term, the most likely source of re-configuration within the Polish 
party system is actually on the centre-right where a new political grouping could be 
formed comprising disillusioned Civic Platform, Law and Justice and non-aligned 
conservatives, coalescing around figures such as Mr Rokita and Mr Markinkiewicz, 
(who remains extremely popular); perhaps using an autumn 2010 presidential bid as a 
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springboard. 86  Given that electoral defeat often triggers centrifugal forces within 
parties, in the short term the most obvious source of political defections is likely to be 
the Law and Justice party. However, in the longer-term it may – ironically - actually 
be Civic Platform that is the more vulnerable to implosion, particularly if the new 
government begins to encounter serious difficulties and the party loses popular 
support. 
 
For sure, there are some reasons to expect why, in the short term at least, a Civic 
Platform-Peasant Party coalition would bring some stability to the Polish political 
scene.87  The two parties fought the 2006 local elections as an electoral bloc and 
worked together successfully in running twelve of Poland’s sixteen regional councils. 
The Peasant Party was always primarily an office-seeking party with a clearly defined 
core electorate and its main priorities being to secure state appointments for its 
supporters and ‘delivering’ for the agricultural sector and rural communities, making 
it a fairly pragmatic negotiating partner and narrowing the field of potential policy 
conflicts. Moreover, as Table 3 shows, the fact that, unlike previous Polish coalitions, 
the two parties had rather different core electoral constituencies, with the Civic 
Platform primarily an urban party, also meant that they would not be competing 
directly for the same voters. However, the new government’s longer-term prospects 
appear more uncertain. Civic Platform mobilised a very broad coalition of voters with 
somewhat different expectations united only in their dislike of the outgoing 
government and, as noted above, in order to make itself electable the party also made 
very bold pledges. So it entered office with both a disparate base of electoral support 
and very high expectations that would be extremely difficult for it to fulfil. 88 
Moreover, the Peasant Party’s previous record in government suggests that it could be 
a difficult and unpredictable coalition partner. 89 This is particularly true when the 
party is defending the privileges of its core rural-agricultural constituency, although 
experience suggests that it could also use other issues to differentiate itself from the 
main governing party when the coalitions of which it is a member began to lose 
popular support. Moreover, in the Law and Justice party, the new government faces a 
sizeable and relentlessly hostile parliamentary opposition backed by the President. 
Since his election in 2005, Lech Kaczyński has been a ‘partisan President’, engaging 
actively to support the party interests of Law and Justice, and is likely to 
intervene in political disputes to undermine the Civic Platform-Peasant Party 
government.90 
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At the same time, the long-term, future cohesion of both Civic Platform and Law and 
Justice depends on their ability to frame broad, integrative ideological narratives. 
Such narratives play a crucial role in holding together, and providing a sustainable 
basis for the development of, durable, diverse and heterogeneous political formations, 
especially when they encounter periods of political crisis. They thereby help to frame 
political action, give cohesion and identity to political organisations, and socialise 
incoming leadership elites.91 However, there are reasons for questioning whether such 
narratives exist in the case of both of these parties and – surprisingly, given the scale 
of its electoral success - this is (arguably) particularly true in the case of Civic 
Platform. For sure, both parties have, to some extent, attempted to develop more 
complex ideological narratives centring on the nature of post-communist 
transformation. Although it faces a difficult challenge of coping with electoral defeat 
and party renewal, and however distorted and cynical its critics might argue that it is, 
Law and Justice has attempted to develop a powerful and coherent conservative-
national project of moral and political renewal based on the creation of a ‘Fourth 
Republic’. 92  Civic Platform, by contrast, has relatively weak ideological 
underpinnings. For sure, it has attempted to espouse a modernising form of pro-
market, right-wing liberalism incorporating a moderate form of social conservatism.93 
However, more recently, and particularly during the 2007 election, it seems self-
consciously to have functioned more as a ‘catch-all’ party of opposition to 
conservative nationalism, downplaying its economic liberalism to ‘borrow’ many 
potential centre-left voters prepared to vote for it as the most effective way of 
removing the Law and Justice party from office. 
 
Moreover, although the 2007 result suggests that any process of renewal is likely to 
take much longer than many anticipated it is also far too early to write off the Polish 
centre-left as a potentially significant electoral force, particularly given the 
plebiscitary nature of this election as, in effect, a referendum on a controversial and 
polarising government, rather than a positive mobilisation for the liberal-conservative 
right. For example, an August-September 2007 CBOS survey found that there was 
clearly a sizeable number of voters floating between the centre-left and Civic Platform, 
with as many as 47% of Left and Democrats voters saying said that they vote for Mr 
Tusk’s party as their second preference and 26% of Civic Platform voters putting the 
Left and Democrats as their second choice.94  Consequently, it was not surprising 
when, as exit poll data shows, in the event 38.5% of those voters who supported the 
parties that comprised the Left and Democrats in 2005 actually switched to Civic 
Platform in 2007.95 With Civic Platform having ‘borrowed’ a substantial number of 
potential centre-left voters anxious to remove the Law and Justice party from office at 
almost any cost and prepared to vote for a liberal-conservative party to achieve this 
objective, this election may have simply been a ‘one off’. Civic Platform could find it 
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extremely difficult to hold on to and ‘absorb’ these voters in the long run.96 Moreover, 
notwithstanding the relatively high levels of socio-cultural conservatism among Poles, 
there is every chance that moral-cultural issues could re-surface as a major line of 
political divisions within Polish politics, particularly given that the potential influence 
of the Church on public life remains a source of concern for many voters, even 
practising Catholics. It is also far from inconceivable that the centre-left could re-
capture the votes of less well-off socio-economic constituencies.97 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although the Law and Justice party increased both its share of the votes and 
parliamentary representation, it finished well behind Civic Platform in the snap 2007 
parliamentary election. The scale of the latter’s victory, on a relatively high turnout, 
came as a surprise as the two main parties were evenly matched for most of the 
campaign. The election is best understood as a plebiscite on a polarising and 
controversial government. Civic Platform, therefore, won because it was able to 
persuade Poles that voting for it was the most effective way of removing a 
government that most of them opposed. However, although it won the election 
decisively, Civic Platform fell short of an overall majority and had to form a coalition 
government with the Peasant Party. 
 
As far as the long-term trajectory of Polish politics is concerned, the 2007 election 
indicates that the ‘post-communist divide’ that dominated and provided a structural 
order to the Polish political scene during the 1990s is passing into history. The 
election result certainly means a more consolidated Polish party system with the 
smallest number of parties elected to the Sejm and the two largest parties winning the 
largest combined share of the vote in any post-1989 election. At the same, the Polish 
state party funding regime seems to have re-inforced the position of the existing party 
‘cartel’ and blocked the emergence of any new entrants into the party system since 
2001. With the collapse in support for the radical parties and continued 
marginalisation of the centre-left, the 2007 election appears to have confirmed the 
electoral hegemony of the Polish centre-right, raising the possibility that the Polish 
party system may now polarise around the two big centre-right groupings with the 
confinement of the left to the status of a minor actor in Polish politics. 
 
However, in spite of this, Polish politics are still in flux and it is far too early to say 
whether we are seeing the emergence of a stable party system based on this new bi-
polar divide. In comparative European terms, Poland still has very high levels of 
electoral volatility and very low electoral turnout, suggesting that most Poles still 
cannot locate themselves in the party system and that the electorate remains an ‘open’ 
one. Together with low levels of party institutionalisation and the extremely weak 
nature of the links between parties and their supporters, which means that Polish 
parties are unstable constructs, this makes further party re-alignments a distinct 
possibility. In the short to medium-term, the most likely source of re-configuration 
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within the Polish party system is actually on the centre-right where a new political 
grouping could be formed comprising disillusioned Civic Platform, Law and Justice 
and non-aligned conservatives. Ironically, it is Civic Platform that might prove to be 
the most vulnerable given that it is likely to face a difficult time in government and 
lacks the kind of integrative ideological narrative needed to hold it together during 
periods of political crisis. It is also far too early to write off the Polish left as a 
significant electoral force. Civic Platform may have ‘borrowed’ a substantial number 
of potential centre-left voters at this election who were anxious to remove the Law 
and Justice party from office at almost any cost and, given that it remains, in essence, 
a centre-right, liberal-conservative party, it will find it difficult to hold on to and 
‘absorb’ these voters in the long run.  
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